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A model of how librarians may actually go about book selection is presented in three ways: 
bounded rationality, tacit knowledge, and symbolic content. It is based on the garbage can deci-
sion process widely used in political and educational organizations, which tend to have open-
ended goals, problematic preferences, hazy technology, and poor feedback. The proposed model 
is reconciled with the modern-day concept of intelligent choice. 
nterest in developing a 
decision-making model of the 
book selection process has 
grown because of dissatisfac-
tion in some circles with the traditional se-
lection literature, particularly its broad 
surveys of principles and criteria. 1 Over 
the past decade, writers have criticized 
this literature for consisting of'' superficial 
and self-evident generalities"2 that leave 
the reader "wondering which criteria are 
most important and how to apply them. ''3 
At first glance, it is not clear that the newly 
proposed models have much in common. 
Some are quantitative and would require, 
if feasible, computers to work, while oth-
ers are interpretive and rely on intuition. 
A closer look, however, indicates that 
they are remarkably similar in scope and 
methodology. 
In scope, the proposed models cover 
much the same ground as the older sur-
veys. The focus of inquiry, chiefly on bib-
liographic factors and collection goals, has 
not been materially clarified or advanced 
beyond the point reached decades ago. 
In methodology, however, the models 
share a set of theoretical concerns unchar-
acteristic of the traditional literature. One 
is classical rationality, defined as simply a 
procedure for deciding what is correct be-
havior by relating means systematically to 
ends. 4 Closely associated is normative anal-
ysis, a prescriptive approach to modeling 
along the lines of ''all rational actors in 
such-and-such a situation will believe or 
act in such-and-such a way.'' 
This article takes a different approach to 
modeling the selection process. Its scope 
is expanded, beyond the features of a 
book or a collection policy, to comprise 
human limitations and their organiza-
tional consequences. The assumption of 
classical rationality is replaced by the con-
cept of bounded rationality, formulated by 
Nobel Laureate Herbert Simon to denote 
our inability to deal with all facets of a 
choice situation.5 Concomitantly, norma-
tive bias about the way things ''should'' 
be done is superseded by behavioral analy-
sis of certain fundamentally ambiguous 
properties of the selection process. These 
properties include: 
1. open-ended goals for collection develop-
ment but few measurable objectives or 
other standards for success; 
2. problematic preferences owing to the ex-
traordinary growth in scholarly publish-
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ing over the past several decades, and to 
the broad question of assessing its intellec-
tual quality; 
3. hazy technology for writing or using 
book reviews; and 
4. little or no feedback about the eventual 
use or value of a given selection. 
For collection development as a whole, 
the addition of a fifth property-fluid 
participation-provides a so-called gar-
bage can process model in which several 
streams of problems, choices, and deci-
sion makers flow through relatively inde-
pendent organizational channels. 
The classical theory of rationality was 
not designed to handle such properties, 
and has never handled them satisfacto-
rily. 6 Indeed, the issue is no longer how 
people can hope to relate means systemat-
ically to ends, for nearly every social sci-
ence recognizes that in the face of even 
moderate uncertainty over measures of 
value, striving for theoretically correct 
courses of action is neither feasible nor 
sensible. Rather, the issue is whether peo-
ple operate reasonably within real-world 
constraints. 7 By considering book selec-
tion in a framework of bounded rational-
ity, this article seeks to reexamine a few 
presumptions of our craft and to make the 
use of subjectivity somewhat less of a 
mystery, somewhat more of a technique. 
"Those who want to understand 
book selection in behavioral terms 
face what seems to be an unsolvable 
problem: that 'selection is always a 
private, cognitive activity that does 
not submit to precise observations or 
delineation. 1 11 
The model set forth here is developed in 
five main parts. Part one assesses previ-
ously proposed schemes of classical ra-
tionality in book selection. Part two out-
lines new approaches to rational choice 
behavior. Part three applies a particular 
approach-bounded rationality in a gar-
bage can decision process-to book selec-
tion. Part four describes the role of tacit 
knowledge and the concept of intelligent 
choice. Finally, part five presents an over-
view of theoretical prospects in this field 
and suggests a few areas for future re-
search. 
CLASSICAL RATIONALITY 
Those who want to understand book se-
lection in behavioral terms face what 
seems to be an unsolvable problem: that 
''selection is always a private, cognitive 
activity that does not submit to precise ob-
servation or delineation. ''8 This problem 
can be managed only by making some as-
sumption about a hypothetical bibliogra-
pher's cognitive processes. If no simplify-
ing assumption is made-and not every 
writer who is critical of the traditional se-
lection literature makes such an 
assumption-no behavioral model is pos-
sible. For example, Hendrik Edelman in a 
well-known essay (on collection develop-
ment by classification of library materials) 
takes the position that, because ''selection 
will be made by different people or even 
groups of people,'' a ''consolidated selec-
tion practice statement is out of the ques-
tion. " 9 
The assumption of classical rationality 
holds that an individual identifies objec-
tives (say, of collection development), 
searches for alternative courses of action, 
evaluates each alternative in comparative 
terms, and then chooses the best course 
(book). This conventional notion is as-
sessed first for quantitative models of the 
selection process, then for interpretive 
schemes. 
Quantitative Models 
One type of quantitative model centers 
on numerical judgments. The method 
used is to compare books by assigning 
them scores for certain collection criteria. 
The model of John Rutledge and Luke 
Swindler, for example, includes six crite-
ria, each with a different range of points to 
represent their relative importance. Thus, 
subject matter is worth up to 30 points, in-
tellectual quality up to 25, and so on for a 
total possible score of 100 per book.10 In 
more elaborate fashion, the John DePew 
model is a combination of a flowchart hav-
ing dozens of decision boxes, some politi-
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cal in nature, and an equation of fifteen 
variables for calculating a book's numeri-
cal score. 11 
The second type of quantitative model 
depends on probability distributions. 
Robert Losee proposes that books be 
ranked according to the statistical range of 
certain bibliographic features whose pa-
rameter values would be computed from 
machine-readable cataloging (MARC) rec-
ords, both for previously selected andre-
jected books. Given the size of new book 
production in the United States (some 
50,000 titles annually), this scheme would 
seem to require a database of overwhelm-
ing proportions. Losee's hypothetical ex-
ample, however, refers to a tiny, carefully 
defined situation in which an art history 
bibliographer would make selections by 
just three factors: a book's height, the 
number of times the term art appears in a 
review of the book, and whether a faculty 
member recommended the book. These 
factors are assumed to have normal, Pois-
son, and binary distributions, respec-
tively.12 
Although such models purport to pro-
vide rationality to the selection process, 
there is no evidence that they are either 
theoretically sound or a sensible guide for 
practitioners. In this field of library work 
where personal theory and practice are al-
lied, these models generate needlessly 
complex analysis, entailing what econo-
mists call the ''excessive costs of per snick-
erty calculation,' ' 13 and they overlook or 
ignore basic principles for making an '' op-
timally imperfect decision.''14 
The principle of dominance pertains to an 
obvious choice situation, one in which a 
book (or other option) is easily evaluated 
on the basis of a few salient criteria. Be-
cause of this principle, complex analysis is 
unnecessary except with respect to non-
dominant options. 15 Although this practi-
cal aspect of selection methodology is dis-
regarded in quantitative models (as if all 
books were tough choices), it is taken for 
granted by some publishers. Thus, it is not 
uncommon for university presses to print 
only a few thousand copies of a book to be 
sold at a high price because the academic 
library "market is assumed to be both cap-
tive and inelastic. " 16 Apparently, the 
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same assumption underlies inflation of in-
stitutional over individual subscription 
rates for scholarly joumals.17 
Two additional principles can be de-
scribed in terms of a trade-off between 
precision and relevance of selection crite-
ria. On the one hand, the Rutledge-
Swindler and the DePew models focus, 
for the most pcri"t, on relevant criteria but 
misrepresent them by an unwarranted 
emphasis on precision. Such emphasis is 
known as the fallacy of misplaced concrete-
ness. 
18 It begins with the presumption that 
good decisions require precise measures 
of alternative choices. Where the essential 
numbers are of doubtful validity, how-
ever, there is little point in characterizing a 
decision process as rational in those 
terms. Rutledge and Swindler concede 
that a ''decision to assign a specific score 
[to a book] will be determined by subjec-
tive judgments," yet they gloss over the 
incongruity of this numbers game by dub-
bing it an art of selection. 19 
In the DePew model, the numbers game 
is extended to political affairs, such as 
whether a book requester is a power base 
or a troublemaker. Even the judgment of 
the requester is scored on a scale of zero to 
eleven. 20 When one considers the objec-
tion of many professors to having a library 
request turned down, one can roughly 
imagine the aggregated fury of an entire 
faculty upon discovering its members be-
ing graded by librarians for knowledge of 
scholarly literature. 
On the other hand, the Losee model 
uses quantitatively precise but largely ir-
relevant selection criteria. Substituting 
literature-wide probability distributions 
for individuals' numerical judgments 
does not alleviate the fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness but rather comEounds it by 
the convenience of reverse logic. 21 Such logic 
starts with the methodology that is most 
agreeable, or most in accord with one's 
notion of rationality, and then moves from 
the predetermined scheme backward to 
find selection criteria for which the 
scheme is relevant. In his discussion of 
normal distributions, for example, Losee 
cites the price, height, weight, and num-
ber of pages of a book. These features are 
physically measurable, some are accessi-
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ble from MARC records, but they are 
hardly logical choices as the basis for eval-
uation. 
Certain other issues of quantifying the 
selection process, such as figuring the in-
tellectual quality of a book, are discussed 
below in section three. For now, attention 
is turned to the practical side of selection 
models. Because time is a scarce resource, 
and the gathering and processing of infor-
mation involve both economic and oppor-
tunity costs, a decision maker must decide 
how much time and other resources to de-
vote to a choice situation. The basic rule is 
stated succinctly by philosopher John 
Rawls: "We should deliberate up to the 
point where the likely benefits from im-
proving our plan are just worth the time 
and effort of reflection."22 
This optimization problem of balancing 
the costs and benefits of complex analysis 
has not been addressed in any discussion 
of book selection. While the traditional li-
brary literature can do without it, quanti-
tative models of book selection sorely 
need a practical orientation. Only if one 
gathers a lot of information about biblio-
graphic details, and then processes it by 
charts or equations, can one act in a way 
that the authors of those models would 
judge to be intelligent. But to obtain that 
sort of information, one would have to 
function quite unfittingly. One would be-
come immersed in picayune matters, such 
as deciding which of fourteen numerical 
categories best suits a book review (De-
Pew model) or counting the number of 
times a particular positive or negative 
word occurs in a review (Losee model). 
Bibliographers will find, on calculation or 
reflection, that this would be an unreason-
able way of allocating their time, let alone 
making decisions. 
Interpretive Models 
While it is commonplace in the library 
field to regard selections more or less as 
the interplay of collection policy and indi-
vidual judgment, Ross Atkinson is the 
only writer to have suggested a model of 
the decision-making process along such 
lines. Atkinson describes a hypothetical 
bibliographer as evaluating a book accord-
ing to an internalized typology of citation 
(or reference) contexts. Most crucial are 
the contexts of resolution, categorized as 
archival (what is known about the collec-
tion), communal (what is known about 
the interests of the clientele), and thematic 
(what is known about the subject litera-
ture). Classical rationality of the interpre-
tive kind is brought into play by a process 
Atkinson terms the ''inevitable weighting 
in different situations of the three con-
texts'': 
Depending upon such factors as the goals of the 
library, the nature of the subject, the status of 
the subject within the library, and the predilec-
tions of the individual selector, the three contexts 
will be prioritized. One context will always take 
precedence over the other two.23 
What is troublesome about Atkinson's 
approach is that contexts of resolution do 
not form a prospective model of the selec-
tion process. Rather, they represent after-
the-fact generalizations. It is tempting to 
evaluate decisions once their outcomes 
are known, yet philosophers and psychol-
ogists agree that we are in constant danger 
of making errors whenever we try to do 
so. 
24 This is because such contexts and 
other schemata-akin to what the late Mi-
chael Polanyi called tacit knowledge25-
generally form the background of our de-
cisions but remain unspecificable, outside 
of conscious awareness and therefore ''in-
compatible with introspective or observa-
tional access to causal necessity. '' 26 
Everyone uses tacit knowledge-
intuition together with experience-to 
make sense of others' behavior and to per-
form skilled tasks. The nature of tacit 
knowledge is not well understood, but 
certain of its characteristics are clear 
enough. First, it departs in a fundamental 
sense from the classical theory of rational-
ity: "we can know more than we can 
tell. " 27 Whenever we are faced with a 
choice or a task of any complexity, we do 
not spell out the key criteria by which all 
other criteria are to be judged and then ap-
ply them in a formal way. Instead, we 
have an indeterminate range of anticipa-
tions and rules of application that cannot 
be consciously directed. 
Thus, in everyday life we can make fine 
discriminations-recognizing a friend's 
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face among a thousand, indeed among a 
million-without being able to put this 
knowledge into words. Likewise, Herbert 
Simon emphasizes in his discussion of 
bounded rationality how tacit consider-
ations pervade professional life: 
In any field of expertise, possession of an elabo-
rate discrimination net that permits recognition 
of any one of tens of thousands of different ob-
jects or situations is one of the basic tools of the 
expert and the principal source of his intui-
tions. 28 
In this perspective, book selection has a 
critical tacit dimension-similar to what a 
British librarian terms the experienced 
glance29 -that cannot be adequately ac-
counted for in classical models of rational-
ity or conventional notions of subjectivity. 
A second characteristic of tacit knowl-
edge is the converse of the first: "we 
sometimes tell more than we can know.' ' 30 
When people attempt to report on why 
they made a particular choice, they do not 
do so by consulting a memory of the cog-
nitive process, for "it is the result of think-
ing, not the process of thinking, that aR-
pears spontaneously in consciousness.' ' 31 
Instead, people simply make judgments 
about how plausible it is that a given factor 
would have influenced the decision. From 
the standpoint of subjective feelings of 
prediction and control, plausibility judg-
ments are natural and disconfirming feed-
back is hard to come by. Nevertheless, 
such judgments are not based on any true 
introspection, but are implicit and exist 
only in use. 
Third, tacit knowledge is personal, in 
the sense of involving one's personality, 
and also in the sense of being solitary. As a 
rule, no two persons share the same tacit 
theories. 32 The type of considerations that 
Atkinson focuses on-collection aims, cli-
entele interests, and subject literatures-
are familiar norms in the library field, yet 
far too general to determine particular 
choices of any complexity to the exclusion 
of other, nondominant options. Some evi-
dence is provided by the Report of the Na-
tional Enquiry into Scholarly Communica-
tion, which found no common denomina-
tor among seven case studies of the book 
selection process: 
May 1989 
A variety of procedures are employed by the in-
stitutions, by item selectors within the same in-
stitution, and by the same selectors over time. 
Indeed, if there are twenty-five selectors in an 
institution, there are at least twenty-six proce-
dures for item selection. 33 
''No theoretic ingenuity can account 
for the profound ways in which some 
people can organize their experiences 
and reshape their capacities for judg-
ing new works.'' 
Finally, the concept of tacit knowledge 
carries with it mechanisms of learning and 
maturation that, being only partially 
translatable into words, cannot be cap-
tured in models. Atkinson rightly de-
scribes a bibliographer's experience as 
''constantly evolving,' '34 yet the essential 
argument, made many years ago by T. S. 
Eliot, is that no theoretic ingenuity can ac-
count for the profound ways in which 
some people can organize their experi-
ences and reshape their capacities for 
judging new works .35 Perhaps we should 
adopt a provisional outlook about ''con-
texts of resolution" and other interpreta-
tions of the selection process, remember-
ing with Lord Tennyson that 
Our little systems have their day; 
They have their day and cease to be. 
NEW APPROACHES TO 
RATIONAL CHOICE BEHAVIOR 
In the social and behavioral sciences, 
there has been growing interest in making 
sense of choice situations characterized by 
abstract goals, ambiguous stimuli, and 
hazy technology. Such interest has led to 
development of three interrelated con-
cepts: bounded rationality, garbage can 
decision process, and loosely coupled sys-
tem. These concepts have been applied to 
educational institutions, publishing 
houses, governmental bodies, multina-
tional corporations, accounting firms, 
welfare agencies, appellate court systems, 
military bureaucracies, and research proj-
ects. 36-44 The studies have little to say about 
libraries directly and only slightly more to 
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report by way of broad quantitative find-
ings. But a realistic model of book selec-
tion can be found in their systems of 
thought. 
Bounded Rationality 
In the 1950s Herbert Simon and others 
found that the micro-assumptions of ra-
tionality in the classical theory of the firm 
are contrary to fact. There is no evidence 
that managers actually equate marginal 
costs and revenues, or that consumers dis-
tribute their purchases in such a way as to 
maximize their utility. 45 From this research 
work arose the concept of bounded ratio-
nality, which takes the limitations of the 
decision maker and the complexities of the 
environment as central concerns. 
Simon has demonstrated that choice be-
havior does not conform to textbook de-
scriptions because individuals lack the 
computational capacity as well as the nec-
essary information to act this way. It is not 
a question of approximation; the shortfall 
in information-processing capabilities, 
relative to environmental complexities, is 
so great that teamwork and even com-
puters are of minor assistance. Decision 
makers introduce, as reasonable re-
sponses, a number of familiar procedures 
to simplify a choice situation. These in-
clude replacing optimal goals with satisfic-
ing ones; devising heuristic (rule-of-
thumb) strategies, so that selections will 
be made after searching only a small part 
of the total choice situation; allocating 
time and other resources with an eye to 
the varying quality of decisions; and, with 
experience, adlusting aspiration levels to 
the attainable. 
Garbage Can Decision Process 
The garbage can analogy is not one of or-
ganizational structure, but of a common 
type of choice situation that appears to 
defy conventional assumptions of ration-
ality. According to such assumptions, 
''choice opportunities lead first to the gen-
eration of decision alternatives, then to an 
evaluation of their consequences, then to 
an evaluation of those consequences in 
terms of objectives, and finally to a deci-
sion. " 47 There is considerable evidence 
that this scenario greatly oversimplifies 
many of the problems that practitioners 
face, especially in educational and public-
sector organizations. 
Case studies of the garbage can process 
typically focus on singular choice in-
stances for group resolution, such as the 
location of a new medical school or the re-
organization of a university curriculum. 48 
With rare exceptions, such studies have 
not dealt with recurrent, less burdensome 
decisions at the individual level, like book 
selection. To illustrate their general tenor 
and findings, consider the selection of an 
academic dean. In the garbage can pro-
cess, goals having to do with the character 
of the institution-hiring women and mi-
norities, upgrading neglected depart-
ments, funding new programs-would 
typically be taken into consideration in the 
selection of the dean. 49 This type of deci-
sion is shaped (somewhat like library col-
lection development as a whole) by sev-
eral relatively independent streams of 
problems, participants, choice opportuni-
ties, and solutions flowing through orga-
nizational networks. 
At the individual level, the research pa-
per has been accurately described in terms 
of tacit knowledge and the garbage can 
process. 51 Certainly, well-ordered models 
of scholarly inquiry-formulate a theoreti-
cal problem, select an appropriate 
method, analyze and interpret the results, 
confirm or deny the theory-are a poor ac-
count of the research experience. Robert 
Merton, dean of Academic sociologists, 
explains the discrepancy: 
[There is a] rockbound difference between the 
finished versions of scientific work as they ap-
pear in print and the actual course of inquiry. . . . 
Typically, the scientific paper or monograph 
presents an immaculate appearance which re-
produces little or nothing of the intuitive leaps, 
false starts, mistakes, loose ends, and happy ac-
cidents that actually cluttered up the inquiry.52 
(That sort of contextual information is 
screened out of scholarly publications by 
editorial conventions. 53) 
Loosely Coupled System 
The idea of loose coupling represents 
the extent of incoherence and disjuncture 
between organizational means and ends. 
Writers use it with a variety of garbage can 
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decision situations in mind: (1) a relative 
lack of formal standards, (2) delegation of 
discretion, (3) occasions in which any one 
of several means will produce the same 
end, ( 4) infrequent inspection or coordina-
tion of activities, and (5) the absence of 
linkages for some theory to be relevant. 
For example, in educational organizations 
there is little feedback from ends to 
means, or feed-forward from means to 
ends, so the casual connections between 
the two are not testable. 54 
Bounded Rationality in 
Book Selection 
Not all behavior within an organization 
conforms to a single model. In a library, 
catalogers tend toward a highly pro-
grammed mode in the interests of biblio-
graphic control, whereas administrators 
usually adopt a contextual approach, 
shifting between bureaucratic and partici-
patory styles. For bibliographers, four 
perspectives of bounded rationality may 
make ordinary experience in book selec-
tion more explicable. These perspec-
tives-open-ended goals, problematic 
preferences, hazy technology, and poor 
feedback-suggest a necessarily more 
complex, loosely coupled model of means 
and ends in collection development than 
that described by conventional theories of 
rational choice. 
Open-Ended Goals 
Libraries have broad, idealistic goals, 
e.g., "to serve the academic community," 
but few measurable objectives, time con-
straints, or other standards for success. If 
it were possible to change this situation 
without trivalizing it into a definitional 
problem, we would want to do so for the 
sake of personnel management. 55 How-
ever, several recent studies of choice be-
havior show that, where means-ends rela-
tions are essentially ambiguous-as they 
are in book selection-schemes of explicit 
objectives are neither representative of 
stable preference orders nor suitable for 
creative interpretation of what the goal 
might mean. 56 About the only way of mak-
ing open-ended goals tractable is to devise 
loosely coupled subgoals (such as collec-
tion development policies broken down 
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by subject descriptors). The aim of sys-
temizing selection goals and their criteria 
into some grand model appears unrealis-
tic. 
Problematic Preferences: 
Book Proliferation 
Bibliographers seem destined to face an 
increasing gap between library budgets 
and potential acquisitions owing to the ex-
traordinary growth of the scholarly enter-
prise in the past several decades. The 
number of new books published in the 
United States displayed no clear trend 
during the first half of the century, hover-
ing around 10,000 titles a year. From 1950 
to 1975, however, the number of new titles 
published annually increased fourfold, 
and by the mid-1980s it surpassed the 
50,000 mark (in addition to some 100,000 
titles imported yearly). Moreover, in the 
decade after 1975 the average price of 
hardcover volumes just about doubled. 57 
In an extensive survey of these publish-
ing trends, the American Academy of 
Learned Societies concluded that "find-
ing ways to help librarians cope intelli-
gently with the flood of material engulfing 
them is central to any rational solution to 
the problems of scholarly communica-
tion.' ' 58 This task must be carried out in 
the face of downward pressures on the to-
tal number of books that libraries are will-
ing to buy-given the sharp increases in 
the number and cost of journals, continu-
ing reductions in federal grants for acqui-
sition programs, and other constraints on 
financing higher education. 
''Although evaluation of intellectual 
quality is an integral part of book se-
lection, there has been virtually no 
discussion of this problem in the li-
brary literature." 
Problematic Preferences: 
Intellectual Quality 
Although evaluation of intellectual 
quality is an integral part of book selec-
tion, there has been virtually no discus-
sion of this problem in the library litera-
Book Selection and Bounded Rationality 335 
ture. Perhaps a general assumption has 
been that ''Quality is rather like obscenity: 
... defining [it] is a futile exercise, even 
though a group of individuals may be able 
to form a consensus on the quality of a par-
ticular item.' '59 While the concept cannot 
be rolled into a neat definition, such a defi-
nition is neither necessary nor appropri-
ate. A wide range of studies show that (1) 
well-established criteria of intellectual cri-
teria do exist but that (2) a group of indi-
viduals, even subject experts, fully com-
mitted to the same criteria will likely 
disagree on their judgments of a given 
work. 
Several large-scale surveys of journal 
editors and referees in the social and be-
havioral sciences have found a striking 
consensus on the importance of a limited 
number of criteria for evaluating manu-
scripts. The main norms indude illumina-
tion of a salient problem, generalizability, 
comprehensiveness, practicality, original-
ity, and integration of diverse theoretical 
perspectives into a single model. 60 One 
survey characterized research milestones 
in just three attributes: providing a differ-
ent direction for researchers or practition-
ers, bringing in this new "truth" from 
outside a sterile field, and treating a spe-
cific and enduring problem. 61 
Such criteria and attributes, like any val-
ues, are equivocal by nature and, when 
employed together, are weighed differ-
ently by individuals. For example, in a 
survey of 299 members of editorial boards 
for psychology journals, there was only 
moderate agreement on evaluations of 
particular manuscripts and even less cor-
relation between those evaluations and 
subsequent judgments by other readers, 
as measured by citation counts. 62 More 
generally, Robert McC. Adams of the Na-
tional Research Council has found that 
this absence of a clear consensus on the 
relative merits of scholarly works "bears 
little relation to field, across the entire 
span from the physical to the social sci-
ences. " 63 
The acceptance or popularity of a piece 
of research in the social and behavioral sci-
ences has little to do with its scientific sup-
port. Instead, what counts as knowledge 
may be only loosely coupled to empirical 
evidence, internal consistency, or predic-
tive power. 64 Some observers suggest that 
pictorial models with high reliability but 
low precision (such as the broken window 
theory of neighborhood decay or the J-
curve theory of political revolution) are es-
pecially useful for the handling of complex 
concepts. 65-67 Others contend that the most 
interesting studies are those with the 
greatest distance between independent 
and dependent variables, e.g., the predic-
tion that single vehicle automobile acci-
dents are influenced by suicide stories on 
television soap operas. 68 
Intellectual quality is often associated 
with iconoclasm, the breaking of estab-
lished theoretical premises. In this view, 
the most important works are those that 
stand in stark relief to taken-for-granted 
concepts: 
By denying the validity of routinely held cogni-
tive assumptions, a theory attracts attention, 
forcing its audience to re-evaluate subject mat-
ter from a novel viewpoint. New propositions 
are interesting or uninteresting only in relation 
to this baseline of traditionally accepted knowl-
edge.69 
The corollary is that a piece of research will 
be considered unimportant if it merely 
proves, however carefully, what is already 
well known. This is particularly true for 
practitioners who need ways of reducing 
the uncertainty of problems where com-
mon sense can go either way: 
Managers are accustomed to making decisions 
under relatively high levels of uncertainty. 
They have little interest in the kind of knowl-
edge about causes and effects that merely in-
creases the certainty of an already apparent re-
lationship. They are decidedly more interested 
in either conceptual knowledge that helps them 
order their thinking about an action area or 
plausible hypotheses that have not previously 
occurred to them. 70 
Iconoclasm, in the broadest sense, un-
derlies Thomas Kuhn's theory of scientific 
revolutions as a succession of tradition-
bound periods in which an older para-
digm is replaced in whole or in part by an 
incompatible new one. The significance of 
paradigms is that they give rise to what 
Kuhn calls normal science: "law, theory, 
application, and instrumentation to-
gether'' to form coherent traditions of re-
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search. 71 Paradigm change depends not 
on the logic of experimental evidence but 
rather on techniques of persuasion: the 
paradigm's promise to solve problems, its 
aesthetic qualities, or something else to 
convince others that it is on the right track. 
Whereas Kuhn professes faith that para-
digm choices are rational, other social phi-
losophers contend that'' our standard the-
ories of what constitutes rationality are 
not adequate to illuminate this complex 
process."72 
Hazy Technology: 
Book Reviews 
Technology is knowledge, not only of 
how to make things but also of how to 
make choices. Two types of studies have 
been done to gauge the reliability of the re-
view process in scholarly communication 
and in book selection. One type concerns 
book criteria, the other reviewer bias. 
Some of the reports on book criteria date 
back several decades, but they generalize 
well with more recent studies that indicate 
reviews are overwhelmingly positive 
though somewhat superficial. For exam-
ple, Dean Champion and Michael Morris, 
in an analysis of 2,378 reviews in three so-
ciological journals over a 23-year period 
(1949-71), found only 18.2 percent of the 
reviews to be negative in their overall ap-
praisals. "The most frequent criticisms 
centered upon substance (29.4 percent), 
while theory and methodology received 
less than 5 percent emphasis, respec-
tively.' ' 73 The paucity of sound criticisms 
was attributed to an implicit norm of reci-
procity in the review process and a conse-
quential "fear of adverse reaction from 
one's colleagues.' ' 74 
Similar results, though with different 
conclusions, were obtained by Beth Ma-
cleod in an analysis of 2,600 reviews in 
Choice and Library Journal in 1978. Only 6 
and 9 percent of the reviews in the respec-
tive journals were negative recommenda-
tions. 75 More often than not, reviewers 
made no mention of the quality of writing, 
depth of analysis, nature of research, or 
uniqueness of the book. Less than 10 per-
cent of reviewers stated and expressed a 
judgment about the author's thesis. Ma-
cleod found that "reviewer anonymity 
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[which was the procedure in Choice at that 
time] does not appear to make for more 
critical reviews." She concluded, instead, 
that the preponderance of favorable rec-
ommendations was essentially a matter of 
initial editorial screening of doubtful ti-
tles.76 This conclusion is supported by the 
apparent agreement on the part of editors 
that if a book is bad, it is not worthy of a 
• 77 
review. 
Reviewer evaluation of books often is 
challenged as unreliable. This is hardly 
surprising in the social and behavioral sci-
ences, given the diversity of methodologi-
cal orientations and the lack of law-like 
generalizations. Although it is widely rec-
ognized that uncertainty in the theoretical 
sphere sometimes is resolved by reference 
to social criteria, such as an author's sta-
tus, reports on specific patterns of bias are 
largely inconclusive. Some patterns are 
contradictory, such as generational effect 
(prestigious reviewers tend to evaluate 
prestigious authors particularly well) as 
opposed to noblesse oblige (the higher the 
prestige of the reviewer relative to that of 
the author, the better the review).78 Other 
patterns are marginal, e.g., Macleod's 
finding that "reviewers [of both sexes] 
were slightly more likely to criticize a book 
by a woman for its shallowness, and to 
praise a book by a man for its depth. " 79 
Overall, the reports suggest an improved 
situation since the 1950s and 1960s, when 
a negative review might impugn an entire 
school of thought.80 Now the greatest criti-
cism tends to come from within, rather 
than outside of, the author's own theory 
group.st 
By and large, people recognize the hazi-
ness of book reviews, as indicated by the 
adage that ''bad reviews are better than no 
reviews at all." Apparently, the tenor of 
reviews in the social sciences has little im-
pact on book sales or library circulation. 82 
Given the widespread and unavoidable 
differences in evaluation of scholarly 
works, particularly at the time of publica-
tion, ''one review is very likely to give a 
rating far from the mean, and even three 
or four reviews cannot be relied upon to 
represent the central tendency of the total 
ratings. " 83 This is not to say that reviews 
are uninteresting or unhelpful, but 
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simply-with reference to quantitative 
models of book selection-that ''a totally 
inappropriate procedure is to derive a 
general rating from a review and to use 
that ratin~ mechanically in the evaluation 
process.'' 
''Feedback is a concept that has little 
practical bearing on book selection as 
a routine process." 
Poor Feedback 
Feedback is a concept that has little prac-
tical bearing on book selection as a routine 
process. It is treated in the library litera-
ture in two distinct ways: performance ap-
praisals of a general kind for individuals, 
and collection use studies as a measure of 
organizational effectiveness. We know, 
for example, that past book use tends to 
predict future use, and that the most re-
cent materials likely receive the most 
use. 85 Such findings, as well as use statis-
tics, are helpful for collection manage-
ment from a retrospective standpoint, as 
in deciding what to discard or to send to 
storage. But they are not conducive to 
book selection in a prospective, singular 
sense, as in identifying specific titles to ac-
quire. 
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a work-
able feedback mechanism for bibliogra-
phers based on collection statistics when 
one considers the time and trouble of pre-
paring such feedback studies compared to 
those of tacit knowledge. Further, the 
samples used in these studies are of lim-
ited significance, inasmuch as record book 
use in most libraries is low, around the 50 
percent mark. Also to be considered is the 
''heavy measure of conservatism'' en-
tailed in providing for fresh patron inter-
ests. 86 
A MODEL OF 
BOOK SELECTION 
A model of book selection -drawing in 
part on the previous text-is described be-
low in terms of three main aspects: 
bounded rationality in a garbage can deci-
sion process, tacit knowledge, and sym-
bolic content. 
Bounded Rationality 
There is no reason to suppose that there 
is a single decision process to which all in-
stances of book selection (or rational 
choice generally) should conform. Collec-
tion goals are varied and imperfectly un-
derstood. Choice alternatives are some-
times dominant, sometimes problematic. 
Technology is hazy. Performance mea-
sures are vague. Decision quality cannot 
be evaluated autonomously but rather re-
quires a long period to establish and de-
pends to some extent on others' decisions. 
Even with careful analysis, feedback is 
ambiguous. As a rule, it is virtually impos-
sible to define a criterion of rationality for 
this type of situation (or, what amounts to 
the same thing, to provide a solution to 
the garbage can decision process). 
A partial exception seems to establish 
this rule. Mention was made above of the 
heuristic maxim articulated by Rawls, that 
we should deliberate on a choice up to the 
point where the likely benefits of analysis 
are just worth the time and trouble. This 
would appear to be unassailable logic. 
Yet, oecause decision makers acting under 
uncertainty routinely ignore it for intelli-
gent reasons (see discussion below on 
symbolic content), one can plausibly ar-
gue that it is deficient not only as a de-
scriptor of behavior but also as a criterion 
of rationality. 
The general point to be emphasized is 
that the assumption of classical rationality 
is not appropriate for book selection and 
should be replaced by the concept of 
bounded rationality in a garbage can deci-
sion context, given our inability to deal 
with all facets of a choice situation. 
Tacit Knowledge 
The ideal of a known, systematic, and 
justifiable cognitive process, as suggested 
in Atkinson's interpretive model, does 
not exist. Instead, reliance must be placed 
on tacit knowledge, whose basic premises 
differ sharply from such an ideal. Tacit 
knowledge accredits the human capacity 
to acquire knowledge by steps one cannot 
specify, it allows for choices to be made 
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within an intuitive framework that is 
largely personal, and it accepts the fact 
that such intuitions are incapable of proof 
or disproof. 87 
An interpretive model, by contrast, ex-
presses more the human ability to form 
post factum theories of one's own behavior 
than an ability to relate means to ends in a 
prospective manner. 88 
We have already considered the meth-
odological problems and excessive costs of 
quantitative models of classical rationality 
in book selection. There remains an issue 
of decision logic. The common presump-
tion of the quantitative schemes is that 
once one has minutely examined and nu-
merically scored different features of a 
book, one has mastered the whole. Un-
derlying this notion is the logic of positiv-
ism: If you cannot measure, your knowl-
edge is meager and unsatisfactory. With 
computers called in to handle all the num-
bers, book selection becomes viewed as an 
engineering problem; in Losee's model, if 
a change in collection development policy 
requires computer reprogramming, "hu-
man selection of new books will be neces-
sary for a time.' ' 89 
However, any attempt to break a book 
down into numerous variables that can be 
analyzed separately misses the essence of 
knowledge and literature: the whole is 
greater than the sum of the parts. 90 In this 
perspective of evaluating a work as a co-
herent whole, we return to a critical tacit 
dimension of the selection process-the 
experienced glance-that cannot be estab-
lished by argument, but is rather some-
thing known directly to the practitioner. 
"Imitation offers guidance to it, but in the 
last resort . . . we alone can catch the 
knack of it; no teacher [or model] can do 
this for us.' ' 91 
Symbolic Content 
In at least one respect, book selection 
(along with certain other kinds of organi-
zational behavior) confounds both the 
classical and the bounded models of ra-
tionality. This has to do with the symbolic 
requirements and signaling opportunities 
o£ choice situations in a garbage can deci-
sion process. 
As we have seen, classical rationality is 
outcome oriented. Primary attention is 
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placed either on systematic analysis of 
ends and means to find the best possible 
decision (quantitative models), or on care-
ful reflection to find the most likely reason 
for a given decision (interpretive models). 
Bounded rationality, on the other hand, 
takes an opposite approach. It attributes 
special value to decision efficiency. Heu-
ristic devices and minimum, or satisficing, 
criteria are emphasized as reasonable re-
sponses to limitations of time and 
information-processing capabilities. 
It makes little sense to focus on out-
comes in the book selection process, as 
though selections were discrete or salient 
events, given the stream of selections year 
after year and the lack of feedback. Nor is 
it advisable to stress the practical side of 
decision making by showing how the 
problematic character of selections might 
be decreased by weakening the require-
ments for rational choice. This is because 
the central purpose of book selection for 
the practitioner may be neither outcomes 
nor efficiency; rather, the main point may 
be the process itself: 
Where the substantive outcome has relatively 
low salience for many participants or where it is 
difficult to establish decision efficacy by observ-
ing outcome effects, we would expect process 
pleasures to become particularly relevant. 92 
In such a view, the way in which a bibliog-
rapher goes about his or her work may be 
explicable only if we recognize that a deci-
sion process is an arena for exercising so-
cial values, for displaying competence, 
and for exhibiting appropriate behavior 
with respect to a core ideological construct 
of modern life: the concept of intelligent 
choice. 93 
Where knowledge of inputs is incom-
plete and, at the same time, outcomes are 
ambiguous, conspicuous consumption of 
information may be a sensible strategy. 
For a bibliographer, reading book reviews 
serves, in part, to provide a ritualistic as-
surance that proper attitudes about collec-
tion development exist. For an adminis-
trator, gathering information, asking for 
information, and justifying decisions in 
terms of information have come to be sig-
nificant ways of showing that the organi-
zation is well managed. 
The symbolic value of information is 
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probably more common to garbage can 
decision processes (administration and 
collection development) than to biblio-
graphic functions (cataloging and circula-
tion). It is probably more common at the 
top of the hierarchy than at the bottom; 
and, for bibliographers, it is probably 
more common in subject literatures lack-
ing paradigms than in scientific fields. 
However, this signaling strategy may be 
compromised-that is, information seek-
ing may be regarded as a sign of indeci-
siveness or lack of faith-if the organiza-
tion acknowledges interpretations of 
decision making that emphasize limited 
rationality, a garbage can process, and 
loosely coupled structure. Not surpris-
ingly, symbolic investments in informa-
tion depend upon conventional concep-
tions of intelligent choice. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Two things can be said on behalf of the 
foregoing model. It treats book selection 
as a rather distinct category of a class of 
decision-making situations well-known in 
social science literature; and, consistent 
with that body of research, it does not at-
tempt to explain too much. 
There are about sixty studies of the gar-
bage can decision process. Nearly all of 
them discuss choice situations as dissimi-
lar, nonrecurrent events for group resolu-
tion. A few studies, chiefly in public ad-
ministration, address the garbage can 
decision process at the level of the individ-
ual policymaker, but they maintain the as-
sumption of dissimilar types of choice sit-
uations and are content to rely on Charles 
Lindblom's classic notion-a precursor to 
bounded rationality-of muddling 
through. 94 Until now, no one has consid-
ered the garbage can decision process 
from the perspective of a practitioner, act-
ing alone, who faces the same type of 
choice situation on a daily basis. Hence, 
the important role of tacit knowledge to 
account for intuition together with experi-
ence in a book selection model. 
It must be realized that the model pre-
sented here is an example of non theory. 
There is no strict proof of the existence or 
extent of tacit knowledge; its acceptance 
II depends on the observation of complex 
performances which not only do not re-
quire conscious direction but which defy 
attempts to codify rules for success.''95 At 
the same time, conventional models of 
book selection, with lists of choice varia-
bles overburdened with box scores and 
process arrows, are not a theoretical expla-
nation of anything. Nor do such schemes, 
as Simon noted in his Nobel address, 
II even remotely describe the processes 
that human beings use for making deci-
sions in complex situations. " 96 Rather, 
when individuals and organizations are 
faced with a profusion of goals and crite-
ria, they behave much like a system with 
almost no goals at all. 
Also, the model in this paper avoids pre-
scriptions. The importance of careful anal-
ysis or reflection is itself subject to ration-
ale appraisal and will depend, like so 
much else, on the individual and the con-
tingencies of his or her situation. 97 Model-
ing cannot fruitfully involve the pursuit of 
such contextual detail. Moreover, a nor-
mative approach would require bibliogra-
phers' acceptance of fairly rigid norms 
about what is rational and acceptable be-
havior. What is so vital to the develop-
ment of either a normative or an explana-
tory theory-a paradigm 11 signaling the 
gestalt in which the situation is to be 
seen"98 -would be calamitously narrow 
for book selection. 
It may be useful to suggest possible 
areas of future research. One such area is 
prompted by the thought that some of the 
bounded rationality properties described 
primarily with reference to social and be-
havioral science books may not fully per-
tain (1) to collection development in the 
physical sciences, given the role of normal 
paradigms for gauging intellectual quality 
in those fields, or (2) to collection develop-
ment in the humanities, in view of various 
cultural establishments of extremely influ-
ential reviewing sources. 99 
Another area for reconsideration might 
be serials management. Some writers 
have proposed methods of classical ra-
tionality for journal evaluation that would 
require, for example, the development of 
lists of citation rankings or productivity/ 
cost ratings for scores of fields. 100'101 No 
one has really addressed the optimization 
problem of balancing the costs and bene-
fits of such complex and time-consuming 
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analyses. Perhaps the conclusions drawn 
in this article with reference to book selec-
tion do not fully apply to serials manage-
ment, since journal acquisitions and de-
acquisitions are more discrete and 
probably more important decisions. 
Further research in the area of collection 
development might benefit from the 
adoption of a particular point of view-
namely, that collection development can 
be described as a garbage can decision 
process if one adds the dimension of fluid 
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participation. Thinking about collection 
development in that framework would at 
least promote frank recognition that there 
is no general way of evaluating the organi-
zational effectiveness of libraries. Karl 
Weick, who conceived the idea of a loosely 
coupled system, once wrote of the need 
for redirecting our concern to one of effec-
tive organizing of the decision process, 
since the doin~ of the process it.self is what 
really counts. 2 
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